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Abstract—The emerging Internet of Things (IoT) challenges
the end-to-end transport of the Internet by low power lossy links
and gateways that perform protocol translations. Protocols such
as CoAP or MQTT-SN are degraded by the overhead of DTLS
sessions, which in common deployment protect content transfer
only up to the gateway. To preserve content security end-to-end
via gateways and proxies, the IETF recently developed Object Se-
curity for Constrained RESTful Environments (OSCORE), which
extends CoAP with content object security features commonly
known from Information Centric Networks (ICN).
This paper presents a comparative analysis of protocol stacks
that protect request-response transactions. We measure pro-
tocol performances of CoAP over DTLS, OSCORE, and the
information-centric Named Data Networking (NDN) protocol on
a large-scale IoT testbed in single- and multi-hop scenarios. Our
findings indicate that (a) OSCORE improves on CoAP over DTLS
in error-prone wireless regimes due to omitting the overhead of
maintaining security sessions at endpoints, and (b) NDN attains
superior robustness and reliability due to its intrinsic network
caches and hop-wise retransmissions.
Index Terms—Internet of things, CoAP, DTLS, ICN, secure
networking, network experimentation
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet design follows an end-to-end principle [1],
which strongly shaped its transport layer. Transport sessions
shall establish directly between applications without interme-
diaries. Secure networking is dominantly deployed by (data-
gram) transport layer security (D)TLS. (D)TLS interception,
however, breaks the end-to-end paradigm from a security
perspective. At the same time, a growing number of use
cases demands for application layer gateways and transport
assistance, which both hinder end-to-end session security.
The Internet of Things (IoT) emerges with massive de-
ployments of constrained devices that are shielded behind
application gateways. These gateways translate between the
Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) over DTLS and
HTTPS, or the Message Queuing Telemetry Transport for
Sensor Networks MQTT-SN over DTLS and MQTT over TLS,
which require re-authentication and re-encryption. In addition,
cryptographic overhead burdens the constrained nodes in its
low end wireless transmission systems and makes it hard to
maintain security sessions for all the small data transfers. The
IoT is thus a use case against end-to-end session security.
Adding security credentials to content objects instead of
transmission channels is an orthogonal approach to secure
communication on the Internet. It changes the session-centric
paradigm by adding authentication and encryption (if desired)
to each data chunk, which in turn allows for content caching
and transport translation at gateways, while preserving data
security properties. Information Centric Networking first in-
troduced content object security on the network layer for the
sake of ubiquitous caching. Recently, the IETF Core working
group released OSCORE, which extends the IoT ecosystem to
content object security.
In this paper, we present and comparatively evaluate the
full solution space for secure content transmission in the IoT.
Starting from a problem statement and related protocol work in
Section II, we present a comprehensive set of implementations
within the RIOT [2] networking subsystem in Section III.
Theoretical evaluations follow in Section IV. Our network
experimentation on a large-scale testbed are discussed in
Section V along with various results that indicate significant
performance improvements over CoAP/DTLS by OSCORE as
well as NDN. Section VI concludes with an outlook.
II. THE PROBLEM OF SECURING IOT CONTENT AND
RELATED PROTOCOL WORK
A. Problem Statement
The Internet of Things is evolving to connect numerous,
often constrained devices that regularly exchange massive
amounts of data. Authenticity and possibly confidentiality of
information is of vital interest in a wide range of applications.
The problem, though, is that low-end devices need to optimize
resources and thus need to minimize cryptographic operations
and state while (re-)transmitting packets.
At the same time, low-power lossy networks frequently
experience packet loss and require retransmissions—multihop
transfers often significantly challenge these error-prone
regimes [3]. Overhead from cryptographic credentials or sig-
naling security sessions consumes additional energy and may
quickly become critical for these low-power devices.
On the contrary, trust relationships in the IoT may be
heterogeneous and change with varying deployment settings.
While the exchanging endpoints are often widely distributed
(e.g., sensors and a cloud), IoT gateways often need to translate
between protocols. If translators are required to re-authenticate
and re-encrypt, all communicating parties must pre-establish
trust with the IoT gateways in place. This will be a major
problem in provider-bound deployments such as 5G.
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Fig. 1: Typical deployment setups for CoAP over DTLS, OSCORE, and NDN in the IoT.
B. Transport Layer Security in the IoT
Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) [4] closely
follows TLS [5] in terms of protocol behavior and security
guarantees. Unlike its stream-oriented relative, DTLS adds fa-
cilities to operate in unreliable datagram environments. It con-
tributes a modified record layer that tolerates packet loss and
message reordering. To break up inter-record dependencies,
DTLS bans stream ciphers and uses explicit sequence numbers
in datagrams. A cryptographic context thus spans exactly one
record. UDP is the prevailing transport in IoT deployments.
Compared to TCP, it exhibits no substantial protocol overhead
and allows for implementations with low memory footprints.
Utilizing DTLS to secure existing application protocols such
as CoAP and MQTT-SN hence appears to be the best logical
choice—at least at first glance.
Concerns arose in recent studies that question the appli-
cability of DTLS in large-scale IoT systems. First, certain
cryptographic challenges during handshake processes are in-
feasible. While processing time for cryptographic operations
diminish with hardware crypto modules, message sizes are
inflated. Asymmetric key ciphers require handshake overhead
and large payload sizes, which immensely boost handshake
completion times to the order of seconds and minutes in multi-
hop deployments due to packet fragmentation [6].
The stateful session characteristic further comes at the cost
of multicast capability, since security contexts are identified
by the classic 5-tuple between two endpoints. Particularly
in scenarios that involve device mobility and multi-homing,
a generally accepted effort applies connection identifiers to
security channels—independent of the 5-tuple [7]. Figure 1 (a)
illustrates a realistic deployment setup for CoAP over DTLS:
End-to-end security commonly terminates at the gateway to
allow for protocol conversions, e.g., to HTTPS over TCP.
C. Content Object Security in the IoT
OSCORE [8] is a protocol extension to CoAP and ad-
dresses the terminating security issue at gateways. Instead
of securing sessions between endpoints, OSCORE protects
entire CoAP messages and provides integrity, authenticity, and
confidentiality on an object level. The original CoAP message
is thereby encapsulated as an authenticated and encrypted
COSE [9] object by an outer CoAP option. In addition to
cryptographic efforts, the protocol further includes counter-
measures to prevent response delay and mismatch attacks. A
strong message binding between requests and corresponding
responses is constructed with the use of identical identifiers
in their authenticated components, which persist over retrans-
missions. Replay windows allow for rearranged messages to
be processed independently. Applications built on it use CoAP
mechanisms like If-Match or the Echo [10] option to protect
against any ill-effects of rearranged messages.
OSCORE utilizes the request-response semantics of its
underlying CoAP layer and an elaborate nonce construction
to obtain compact response messages. When combined with
CoAP observation (continuous responses to a single request),
OSCORE protects the sequence of notifications using its
own sequence numbers. When combined with CoAP block-
wise transfer, it fragments large resources into pieces small
enough for the end points to process in a single cryptographic
operation without hindering further block-wise processing by
proxies. Unlike DTLS, OSCORE does not come with a built-
in key exchange protocol, and relies on pre-shared keys. A
lightweight authenticated key exchange (LAKE [11]) is being
developed as a companion protocol.
A major improvement over the conventional transport layer
security concept is the ability to secure multicast messages.
CoAP supports a one-to-many group communication [12]
when used with UDP. While DTLS fails to perform in
multicast environments, the object security characteristic of
OSCORE allows for protected requests and responses in these
deployments [13].
Figure 1 (b) illustrates the envisioned deployment option.
Messages are cryptographically secured and despite protocol
conversions on gateways, their properties stay intact while
traversing up to cloud services.
D. Content Security in the Information-Centric IoT
Information-centric Networking [14], [15]—a clean-slate
approach of the Future Internet initiatives—abandons the host-
centric Internet paradigm in the favor of autonomous content,
which allow for an unhindered replication of authenticated data
objects. A decade of research has created a variety of ICN
flavors that have three principles in common [16]: Decoupling
of named content from hosts, universal caching, and content
object security.
Named Data Networking (NDN) [17] enjoys significant
popularity and has been identified early as a candidate for
low-end IoT edge networking [18]. An adaptation layer to
the low power lossy wireless exists with ICNLoWPAN [19].
In contrast to the end-to-end stateless packet processing on
the Internet, NDN utilizes a stateful, hop-by-hop forwarding
fabric that decouples content objects from their locations and
enables seamless on-path caching. NDN follows a simple
request-response scheme on the network layer using the two
message types Interest and Data, each treated individually
by the forwarding state machine. Figure 1 (c) illustrates the
additional content caches that support content replication and
local recovery from losses.
NDN supports integrity and authenticity as protocol features
by appending cryptographic signatures to data packets. While
originally the intrinsic security only applied to data packets,
the upcoming NDN protocol version allows for a signature
inclusion in Interests. Confidentiality is not supported on the
protocol level, but left to the application to encrypt content.
III. COMPOSABLE NETWORK STACKS FOR OBJECT
SECURITY IN CHALLENGED IOT DEPLOYMENTS
The decision for a software platform that can cope with
constrained IoT is crucial. As we aim for maintainability and
sustainability, we extend existing code bases instead designing
and implementing from scratch. As such, we utilize the open
source IoT operating system RIOT [20] and leverage the
existing network stack architecture. In course of our evalua-
tions, we contribute and upstream improvements to the RIOT
integrations of DTLS, OSCORE, and NDN.
A. The RIOT Networking Subsystem
The RIOT networking subsystem displays two interfaces
to its externals (see Figure 2): The application programming
interface sock and the device driver API netdev. Internal
to stacks, protocol layers interact via the unified interface
netapi, thereby defining a recursive layering of a single
concept that enables interaction between various building
blocks: 6lo with MAC, IP with routing protocols, transport
layers with application protocols, etc. This grants enhanced
flexibility for network devices that come with stacks integrated
at different levels.
B. CoAP Over DTLS
gCoAP is the feature-rich native CoAP implementation of
RIOT. It implements the server-side and client-side, it supports
the most common methods GET, POST, PUT, DELETE,
it handles confirmable messages, and it allows for observ-
ing resources. As depicted in Figure 2, gCoAP uses the
sock API. On the north-bound it attaches to sock_udp
and sock_dtls, which makes it completely network stack
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Fig. 2: The RIOT networking subsystem.
agnostic. In the default configuration, the native 6LoWPAN
network stack of RIOT, GNRC, provides the south-bound
implementation of sock_udp. The DTLS counterpart is
provided by the external package tinyDTLS. It follows a
threadless design and depends on events, which are handled
by the sock layer within the gCoAP thread. This DTLS setup
supports two ciphersuits: (i) pre-shared authentication and key
exchange using AES encryption in Counter with CBC-MAC
(CCM) [21] mode with a 128-bit key length, and (ii) an Elliptic
Curve Cryptography (ECC) based AES-CCM with an Elliptic
Curve Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral (ECDHE) key exchange.
C. CoAP With OSCORE
We provide libOSCORE1 as an implementation of the
OSCORE [8] model that integrates into RIOT. Unlike other
approaches, e.g., a yet to be mainstreamed contiki implementa-
tion2 and c OSCORE3 on top of Zephyr, libOSCORE focuses
on portability across different CoAP libraries and provides
replay protection.
Distinct features of libOSCORE are its handling of the
request-response correlation data and its zero-copy approach.
In the former, Partial IVs are consistently passed by reference.
They carry a flag indicating first use, which gets invalidated by
consumers. This allows leveraging OSCORE optimizations for
safe REST operations. In memory management, libOSCORE
expects its user to provide suitable memory locations and
provides struct definitions to make that portable. This saves
execution time, RAM and ROM at the cost of some imple-
mentation complexity on the user side. It allows processing of
messages from the receive-buffer in a single reading pass after
in-place decryption and without dynamic memory allocation.
1https://gitlab.com/oscore/liboscore
2https://github.com/Gunzter/contiki-ng/tree/oscore 12
3https://github.com/Fraunhofer-AISEC/c OSCORE
In CoAP libraries that build and read their messages in
buffers (cf, gCoAP), integration of libOSCORE happens in
two stages: (i) basic integration, and (ii) full integration.
The basic integration describes the most elementary way of
interacting with libOSCORE. It only requires a mapping of
certain CoAP operations and cryptographic primitives. Appli-
cations that use this mode directly access OSCORE objects
and steer every step of the encryption and decryption process
for each packet. Generally, usage of this mode is tedious and
error-prone and therefore discouraged for user applications.
On the other hand, a basic integration allows for a full control
of OSCORE internals, which can be leveraged to perform
protocol optimizations by libraries or protocol extensions.
The full integration requires a functional basic integration
as prerequisite. At that stage, libOSCORE messages are used
as backends for the native CoAP library. Application code
is identical for the unprotected and OSCORE-protected case,
and thus tightly coupled to the native CoAP implementation.
The CoAP library dispatches operations on messages through
libOSCORE atop of, or directly through the transport pro-
tocol, depending on the application’s configuration (e.g., the
choice of a security context for a message) or presence of the
OSCORE option. This mode of operation is the recommended
way of building user applications, as APIs hide security
operations and prevent security breaches due to a misuse of
OSCORE internals. The stack in Figure 2 shows the full
integration state where applications interact only with gCoAP.
An intermediate integration is available in libOSCORE for
cases when full integration is unfeasible with a particular
library or simply incomplete. At that level, an additional
library provides code to orchestrate and simplify cryptographic
procedures. This mode is most suited for narrow-purpose
helper libraries up to full-fledged REST frameworks, which
generally provide their own APIs towards user applications.
D. Named Data Networking
CCN-lite [22] is a lightweight NDN forwarder, which
supports all primary features: in-network caches, hop-wise
retransmissions, request aggregation along paths, and multi-
source, multi-destination forwarding. It runs on a variety of
hardware platforms—ranging from commodity hardware to
embedded devices. While the core forwarder is self-contained
and platform independent, adaptors provide access to the
system communication API. CCN-lite is integrated into RIOT
as an external package. It contributes a RIOT adaptor, which
hosts its own thread and translates between CCN-lite messages
and netapi packets.
IV. THEORETICAL EVALUATION
Performance measures such as security properties largely
differ for each protocol configuration. In the following, our
performance assessment considers protocol design choices
and thus provides insights that are independent of specific
deployments. We focus on four protocol compositions: (i)
CoAP (Protected) with encrypted and authenticated response
payload as baseline implementation. (ii) CoAP over a secured
DTLS 1.2 session. (iii) OSCORE to provide object security
for request and response messages. (iv) NDN (Protected) using
signed Data messages and encrypted as well as authenticated
content.
A. Security Properties
CoAP (Protected) exhibits the weakest security properties
in our comparison: While it uses an authenticated encryption
for the payload, it does not provide any security measures
for the actual CoAP messages to protect CoAP signaling.
Protocol headers are prone to tampering and messages are
susceptible to interception as well as packet delay attacks.
These shortcomings make the binding of requests to correct
responses fragile. The inability to map responses to particular
requests is especially dangerous in cases when resources pub-
lish mutable content [10], [23]. Consequently, even in the case
when the payload is secured, delayed and replayed messages
can affect the state machine on the client and server. Since
the message headers are not protected against confidentiality
attacks, this configuration easily leads to privacy concerns.
Plaintext requests will contain resource URIs, which typically
help to identify sensitive application information and therefore
potentially leak private data. Responses may not include
resource URIs, but included tokens unambiguously identify
potentially intercepted requests and thus their resource URIs.
CoAP over DTLS is the common method for securing
message transmissions in an IoT network. DTLS provides
integrity, authenticity, and confidentiality for UDP datagrams
within sessions based on pre-established private keys. It
operates below the application layer and inherently takes
CoAP requests as well as responses into consideration. A
drawback from this layering, however, is that the DTLS record
layer is not aware of CoAP semantics. This introduces a
twofold problem: First, this configuration suffers from the
same request-response binding issues when messages are
delayed and replayed [23] while recent mitigations [10] are
not deployed yet. Second, end-to-end security terminates at
gateways in usual IoT setups when protocol conversions from
CoAP to HTTP take place. Minimal DTLS implementa-
tions commonly provide the lightweight DTLS cipher suite
TLS PSK WITH AES 128 CCM 8 [24], which does not
provide perfect forward secrecy. Adaptations [25], allow for
the combination of existing cipher suites with the Ephemeral
Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol.
OSCORE achieves a secured communication by protecting
request and response messages on CoAP level. This is in
contrast to CoAP over DTLS that establishes secure channels
between endpoints. OSCORE provides integrity, authenticity,
and confidentiality by nesting the actual CoAP message as an
authenticated and encrypted payload, interleaving information
relevant to routing and retransmission in the unprotected outer
parts. This layer hides sensitive information, such as the
resource path and the CoAP method of the original mes-
sage. Furthermore, the security of inner messages stays intact
across protocol translations on gateways (e.g., from CoAP
TABLE I: Summary of security properties for each protocol
configuration. (3) indicates optional specifications, which are
unavailable in the used implementations.
CoAP NDN
Protected DTLS OSCORE Protected
Request Message
Integrity 8 3 3 (3)
Authenticity 8 3 3 (3)
Confidentiality 8 3 3 8
Response Message
Integrity 8 3 3 3
Authenticity 8 3 3 3
Confidentiality 8 3 3 8
Attack Resiliency
Replay Insensitivity 8 (3) 3 3
Perfect Forward Secrecy 8 (3) 8 8
to HTTP/S). OSCORE provides a strong request-response
binding with mechanisms like sequence counters and sliding
windows, which renders many attacks ineffective. The original
specification is missing a key exchange protocol and thus does
not provide perfect forward secrecy. Adaptations [26] allow for
an Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman over COSE.
NDN authenticates response messages between arbitrary
endpoints without the need for session state. While appli-
cation payload can be encrypted, NDN does not provide
confidentiality for message headers. Moreover, NDN reduces
security features to response messages only4. Names are an
integral part of the NDN forwarding fabric and may contain
sensitive application information. Thus, privacy concerns arise
from plaintext names in NDN messages. An encryption or
obfuscation of names inevitably affects the routing system and
adds an exhaustive overhead. Unlike the CoAP variants, NDN
follows the principle of immutable content: A specific name
invariably points to the same content object. This property
reduces the attack surface and desensitizes applications to
delayed and replayed messages.
We summarize the observed advantages and drawbacks of
the discussed protocol schemes in Table I, with a strong focus
on the actual protocol behavior rather than on application
payload security.
B. Security Message Overhead
In all protocol configurations, security extensions add mes-
sage overhead and consequently affect transmission times.
Notably for IEEE 802.15.4, inflated messages easily increase
media access times by a few milliseconds, whereas computa-
tional overhead in common IoT network stacks is in the range
of microseconds [27]. We now quantify the overhead in terms
of packet size which is introduced by the different security
extensions. In Section IV-C, we will put this into perspective
with respect to the common CoAP and NDN packets.
CoAP (Protected) and NDN (Protected) do not add any
message overhead to requests. All configurations other than
CoAP (Protected) add a structural overhead related to security.
4Specification v0.3 is in progress and adds security features to Interests
TABLE II: Message overhead of security measures in bytes.
Overhead does not apply to CoAP and NDN requests.
CoAP NDN
Protected DTLS OSCORE Protected
Req Resp Req Resp Req Resp Req Resp
Structure – 0 11 11 4 3 – 11
Context ID – 2 2 2 1 0 – 1
Nonce – 2 8 8 1 0 – 0
MAC – 8 8 8 8 8 – 40
DTLS includes 11 bytes for the DTLS 1.2 record layer in
all datagrams, excluding the epoch field. The NDN packet
format uses flexible Type-Length-Value (TLV) fields to encode
message headers. Security related TLVs similarly account for
11 bytes overhead. OSCORE exploits implicit information that
results from a strong request-response binding and further uti-
lizes a minimal CBOR representation. This nets to a structural
overhead of four and three bytes.
The security context identifier consists of two bytes for
CoAP (Protected) and CoAP over DTLS. In the former sce-
nario, contexts are identified by the 2-byte key identifier within
our payload, while the latter scenario uses a 2-byte epoch field
in the record layer to denote a secured session. OSCORE and
NDN are able to reduce the length of small context identifiers.
OSCORE omits the security context in response messages and
requesting devices must deduce it from the request state.
For AES in CCM mode, the same nonce is required for
encryption and decryption. The nonce is of variable length
and usually ranges between 7–13 bytes [21]. We design our
experiment to use partially implicit nonces [28]. Two bytes
of the nonce are encoded into messages, while the remaining
bytes are deduced implicitly, e.g., from the hash of a resource
URI. This allows 216 messages per resource until a refresh of
established security contexts is advisable. OSCORE repeatedly
encodes smaller values in a single byte and CoAP (Protected)
uses a 2-byte representation. In responses, OSCORE uses the
same nonce to protect objects and thus omits the nonce. CoAP
over DTLS uses eight bytes as a result of concatenating the
epoch and sequence number fields. The remaining four bytes
of the DTLS nonce are implicit and generated as part of the
handshake process [24]. NDN benefits from the immutable
content property: Since names always map to the respective
content, its hash is used as nonce.
We use a message authentication code of eight bytes as
defined by the TLS AES-CCM cipher suites [24]. NDN
appends another 32-byte HMAC signature that envelops the
complete response packet.
Table II summarizes the message overhead for the discussed
protocols.
C. Security Overhead in Comparison to Basic CoAP and
NDN Messages
We now dissect each message of the protocols under com-
parison in detail and relate the basic CoAP and NDN packet
sizes to the security extension (see Figure 3). Our analysis
CoAP
Fragmentation
Get
Response
0
32
64
96
128
160
192
Pa
ck
et
Si
ze
[b
] CoAP
AES128
CCM-8
Get
Response
DTLS Handshake
AES128-CCM-8
CoAP
DTLS
ClientHello
HelloVerifyRequest
ClientHello+Cookie
ServerHello
ServerHelloDone
ClientKeyEx.
ChangeCipher
Finish
Get
Response
OSCORE
AES128
CCM-8
Get
Response
NDN
Interest
Data
NDN
AES128
CCM-8
HMAC256
Interest
Data
IEEE 802.15.4 6LoWPAN UDP CoAP DTLS NDN
Fig. 3: Packet structures of control- and data-plane packets for each protocol configuration.
distinguishes between requests and responses and includes all
handshake messages for DTLS. We assume that a response
payload includes a 2-byte temperature value.
IEEE 802.15.4 admits a maximum physical layer packet
size of 127 octets. Assuming a typical configuration of 8-byte
source and destination hardware addresses, considering a given
2-byte frame control field, 1-byte sequence number, 2-byte
PAN id, and a 2-byte frame check sequence, the total MAC
header overhead adds up to 23 bytes for each protocol. This
leaves 104 bytes for upper layer headers and user data.
In CoAP setups, the 6LoWPAN header occupies 35 bytes
because it accommodates three 6LoWPAN dispatch bytes and
two IPv6 addresses. Moreover, each packet counts six bytes
for the compressed UDP header.
Special consideration is required for ClientHello and Server-
Hello packets in a DTLS handshake. In contrast to previous
calculation, they surpass the maximum physical packet size
and trigger a hop-wise 6LoWPAN fragmentation. While the
MAC header overhead is therefore doubled, the 6LoWPAN
overhead increases by only nine bytes for the inclusion of
fragmentation dispatches in both fragments.
In contrast to unprotected CoAP responses, CoAP (Pro-
tected) messages inflate by 12 bytes to include the context
id, nonce, and message authentication code of AES-CCM
(see Section IV-B). CoAP over DTLS emits 29 and 27 more
bytes for requests and responses, respectively, due to the
DTLS record layer. OSCORE messages display similar but
extenuating effects: requests increase by 14 and responses by
only 11 bytes. The primary explanation for this surprisingly
smaller increase is a reduced header overhead of OSCORE
compared to the DTLS 1.2 record layer. Nonces are further
omitted from responses to decrease their header overhead.
In contrast to CoAP, where responses display smaller packet
sizes than requests, NDN data packets exhibit larger sizes
than Interests. This is a result of names being fully included
in returning data packets. NDN data packets increase by an
8-byte AES-CCM MAC and an 32-byte HMAC signature,
compared to unsecured NDN packets with an overall packet
size of 64 bytes. Since Interest messages do not contain any
security measures, their packet sizes remain unaffected.
V. EVALUATION IN THE TESTBED
In this section, we compare the different protocol configu-
rations based on real implementations deployed in a testbed.
A. Experiment Setup
Scenarios & Parameters. We want to quantify the perfor-
mances of a protected CoAP and NDN communication in a
typical IoT data collection scenario with multiple sensor nodes.
For this, subsequent requests periodically traverse a gateway
into an IoT stub network. Each sensor device is requested 1000
times at an interval of 2±0.5s and returns a 2-byte temperature
reading. To allow for comparison of pull-based NDN with
CoAP, we limit CoAP methods to confirmable GET.
We align our experiments with respect to retransmission and
timeout configurations. All protocols employ the same retrans-
mission strategy: On failures, nodes wait two seconds before
retransmitting the original request. In NDN, retransmissions
are performed hop-by-hop, while CoAP performs them end-
to-end. At most four retransmissions will occur for each data.
We do not consider congestion from external cross-traffic in
this work. However, each individual transmission experiences
self-induced background traffic from on-going requests and
retransmissions. The jittered request interval further mixes the
event space and allows a greater exploration of the state space.
On average, this cross-traffic is constant per experimental run.
Software & Hardware Platform. All devices run RIOT
version 2019.10. NDN deployments are based on CCN-lite,
and CoAP experiments use the default GNRC network stack
of RIOT including libOSCORE and tinyDTLS (cf, Section III).
We conduct all experiments on the FIT IoT-LAB [29]
testbed. The hardware platform consists of class 2 devices [30]
featuring an ARM Cortex-M3 MCU with 64 kB of RAM and
512 kB of ROM. Each device is equipped with an Atmel
AT86RF231 [31] transceiver to operate on the IEEE 802.15.4
radio. The testbed provides access to several sites with varying
properties. We perform our experiments on the grenoble site in
a single-hop and multi-hop configuration. Our single-hop setup
consists of one gateway node and ten sensor nodes in broadcast
range as illustrated in Figure 4. In the multi-hop configuration,
we use one gateway node, ten sensor nodes, and five forwarder
Single-hop Multi-hop
Gateway Gateway
Forwarders
Sensor nodes
Sensor nodes
Fig. 4: Topologies for single-hop and multi-hop experiments.
nodes. Forwarding states are statically configured on each node
to form the topology depicted in Figure 4.
Protocol Configurations & Start-Up Conditions. In all
setups, we use AES in CCM mode with a 128-bit key and
limit the resulting message authentication code to eight bytes
as described in [24]. Each configuration also contains a 1-byte
key identifier where applicable. The NDN (Protected) setup
further includes a hash-based message authentication code
(HMAC) salted with a pre-shared key. We limit the number
of security contexts on the gateway to ten and on each sensor
node to one. As a consequence, sensor devices maintain only
one DTLS session concurrently and all secured content objects
from a particular sensor device use a single security context.
We configure all compared security protocols with pre-shared
keys and context related variables, such as sequence counters,
are set to default on device start-up.
B. Time to Completion
We examine the delays measured between content requests
and content arrivals at the gateway. Figure 5 combines the
results for CoAP and NDN configurations in the single-hop
and multi-hop setup. We first observe that protocol families
are in rough accordance in the single-hop case. Temporal
performances indicate a subsecond completion time for close
to 100% of all transmissions across the protocols. The unpro-
tected NDN configuration displays the fastest operation with
50% of transmissions finishing below 11 ms. Combining this
observation with our previous result that NDN transmits the
smallest request and response messages (see Figure 3), we
can assume that unprotected NDN operates quickly. In the
unprotected CoAP configuration, 50% of transmissions finish
below 13 ms. The protected protocol versions follow closely,
whereby CoAP over DTLS is on the slow end with 50% of
transmissions finishing below 16 ms.
We then consider the more challenging multi-hop scenario.
Overall, results reveal a much slower protocol operation. This
reflects the common experience in low-power regimes that ra-
dio interferences and individual error probabilities accumulate
over several hops and decrease global reliability. The staircase
pattern visible for each protocol is based on request retrans-
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Fig. 5: Temporal distributions of content arrival times.
missions and the configured interval of 2 s per retransmission.
On the slower end, stairs show attenuating effects due to an
accumulating jitter for each retransmission. We observe that
all CoAP variants operate in agreement. Roughly 55–60%
of content requests complete in the subsecond range without
requiring retransmissions. Corrective actions delay the com-
pletion time, but are able to increase the number of successful
responses at the gateway to 70–77%. The effects of inflated
messages also become apparent: CoAP emits the smallest
packets and reveals a better performance than CoAP over
DTLS, which emits the largest packets. The delay distributions
for NDN show surprising results. Approximately 40–55% of
all responses arrive in the subsecond range at the gateway
and therefore may indicate worse performances for NDN
compared to the CoAP variants. The determining factor for this
discrepancy is due to the different retransmissions strategies.
NDN implements hop-wise retransmission, which raises the
number of packets on a forwarding path. This leads to more
likely interferences that affect ongoing and subsequent content
requests. The effect of hop-wise retransmissions, however, is
two-sided and unfolds advantageous effects when combined
with in-network caching. Corrective actions are able to boost
the overall reliability of the NDN family to 92–97%.
C. Security Setup Overhead
We now inspect the case where an endpoint repeatedly
connects to the IoT stub network to retrieve sensor readings.
This setup follows the previous single-hop scenario with one
minor change: The endpoint at the gateway executes the steps
necessary for entering a deep sleep mode after 20% of all ex-
changes. Figure 6 summarizes the evolution of content arrival
times throughout an experiment duration of ten minutes. In
the top row, we observe time to completion measurements for
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Fig. 6: Content arrival times and their percental distribution during the evolution of an experiment in a single-hop scenario.
each protocol, while the bottom row visualizes the percental
distribution for measured completion times.
Mostly the completion times reflect the same results as pre-
sented in Figure 5. An obvious exception to this is CoAP over
DTLS. After a loss of library state at the gateway, a session
handshake precedes the initial request. A handshake for the
configured cipher suite amounts to a total of ten DTLS packet
transmissions. Figure 3 depicts the makeup of these packets
and clearly shows that their sizes are comparable and in some
cases even much larger than sizes of the actual authenticated
and encrypted user packets. Our evaluation shows that DTLS
handshakes complete after around 100 ms, whereas in rare
cases they even require up to 150 ms. Since these handshakes
take place between a single hop, their completion time serves
as a good lower bound estimation for more complex scenarios.
Realistic multi-hop deployments with sufficient cross-side
traffic and radio interferences are estimated to easily multiply
these values for each added hop on a forwarding path.
A proper DTLS session resumption [32] and Connection
IDs [7] could reduce the effects of handshakes after deep sleep
or address changes, but are not available in tinyDTLS and
require the persistence of context information that scales with
the number of connected sensor devices.
D. Request Creation Time
Our next evaluation gauges the message creation time of re-
quests. We measure the time starting from when an application
triggers a request and stop it as soon as the packet is about to
be passed to the next layer, which is UDP in the CoAP variants
and the link-layer in NDN. Figure 7 visualizes the results using
two bar plots for each protocol. The first bar shows average
creation times for initial requests and the second bar denotes
average creation times for request retransmissions.
CoAP in its unprotected and protected configurations ex-
hibits the lowest creation times at around 280 µs. Since the
protected version only affects responses, equal times for re-
quests are expected. In both protocol versions, retransmissions
are built much quicker in around 43 µs, since they already exist
in retransmission buffers. NDN behaves similarly, but creation
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Fig. 7: Creation time for initial and retransmitted requests.
times increase to ≈ 810 µs for initial requests and ≈ 95 µs for
request retransmissions. CoAP over DTLS behaves differently
but mostly as expected. Initial request creation times escalate
to around 600 µs due to the authenticated encryption. In-
terestingly, request retransmissions reveal unexpected results.
Requests exist in CoAP retransmission buffers and reduce
overall creation times, but they still require to pass through
the DTLS layer. Hence, retransmission creation times spend
on average around 353 µs and therefore eight times the amount
of other CoAP setups. This problem arises because of layering
different protocols, which is not present in the OSCORE.
Protection takes place on the CoAP layer and retransmission
buffers already contain protected messages. Creation times for
retransmissions reside at around 45 µs and are thus comparable
to the protected and unprotected CoAP composition.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK
In this paper, we presented the first comprehensive analysis
of protocols that aim for securing content in the Internet
of Things, with a special focus on constrained, low-power
networks. We conducted a theoretical and an experimental
study, which compared different CoAP configurations, OS-
CORE, and named-data networking. Selecting these protocols,
we spanned the full solution space from end-to-end security
sessions that act on transport channels to approaches that
secure each data chunk individually.
Our findings indicate that in simple single-hop scenarios
both security paradigms perform similarly in terms of content
delivery. Surprisingly, OSCORE, which is integrated into the
CoAP mechanics, exhibits a much smaller security header
overhead. This results in smaller packets and thus reduces
latencies compared to the common CoAP over DTLS setup.
In challenged multi-hop topologies, we observed significant
distinctions between the different protocols. NDN benefits
from both hop-wise transfer and in-network caches, which
increase the reliability of data delivery remarkably and thus
outperforms the other approaches.
As we show both the impact of overheads and of hop-by-
hop retransmissions, these results help justify, guide and (in
future work) evaluate further improvements in the compared
protocols: The upcoming DTLS 1.3 will optimize the record
layer footprint [33]. OSCORE extensions that allow compar-
ing the effects of unanticipated shutdowns (OSCORE replay
window recovery [8, Appendix B.1] or LAKE [11]) will need
to keep extra round-trips to a minimum. Cacheable group
observations [34] could bring NDN-like features to CoAP,
which would be beneficial as discussed in this paper. We will
analyze these emerging approaches in future work.
A Note on Reproducibility. We fully support reproducible
research [35], [36] and perform all our experiments using
open source software and an open access testbed. Code and
documentation will be available on Github at https://github.
com/inetrg/IFIP-Networking-2020.
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